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Graduation Prayer After Lee v.
Weisman: A Cautionary Tale
by Stephen B. Pershing
Loudoun County, Virginia, is a lush expanse of fields and rolling hills
at the edge of the burgeoning Washington metropolis. Its growing
population' is heavily white,2 affluent,' and Christian.4 In 1993, a
year after the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman,' the county
not surprisingly became an arena for the resurgence of a familiar

* Legal director, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia. Harvard University (B.A.,
1979); University of Virginia (J.D., 1987). The author was one of the attorneys for the
plaintiffs in Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993), the
case which forms the basis for this Article. The author is much indebted to Virginia ACLU
cooperating attorneys Victor Glasberg and Jeanne Goldberg, who as lead counsel developed
the legal arguments and the factual record that make this case so suitable and accessible
for study. Thanks are also due to Robert Alley, Sarita Brown, Steven Green, Robert Peck,
and Kent Willis.
1. The county's 1981 population was estimated at 58,403, its 1986 population at 67,627,
and its 1991 population at 90,300. University of Virginia Center for Public Service,
Virginia Statistical Abstracts 577 (1994) [hereinafter "VSA 1994"].
2. The county's 1990 population was 86,129. Of that number, 77,095, or 89.5%, were
white. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of
Population and Housing (1991).
3. With a per capita personal income of $26,398 in 1991, Loudoun ranked fourth among
the state's 100-plus counties and cities, behind only Alexandria, Arlington County, and the
combination of Fairfax County and the cities of Fairfax and Falls Church. VSA 1994,
supra note 1, at 414-15. The county had Virginia's second lowest proportion of persons
living below the poverty line at 3.1%. VSA 1994, supra note 1, at 435-36.
4. The county "has numerous Christian churches, but no known synagogues, mosques,
Buddhist meditation centers, or other minority religious institutions except for a Christian
Science Reading Room and a New Age Meditation Center." Joint Stipulation of Facts,
Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993) [hereinafter
"GearonJoint Stipulation"], at 8. As of 1993 all but one member of the local school board,
as well as all of the high school principals, the school superintendent, and the student
speakers in the case were Christian. Id. at 7.
5. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (striking down official prayer at high school graduation
ceremonies).
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majoritarian dispute: the legality and propriety of officially sponsored
prayer in America's public schools.
This Article tells the story of the Loudoun County graduation prayer
litigation, and tries to set the case in context. It ponders doctrinal
questions from an unabashedly separationist perspective, but it offers
words of caution for both sides in the debate. For while the notion of
officially promoted group prayer for public school students raises
Establishment Clause alarms that are as urgent today as they were a
generation ago in Engel v. Vitale,' the current wave of school prayer
controversy also involves questions of individual free speech that are
only now receiving fuller treatment in the courts and the academic
literature.
The latest school prayer furor was predictable from the well-known
antagonism of some, though by no means all, devout religionists to court
decisions of the past generation that have restricted public school prayer
in one way or another.7 The latest chapter of the dispute opened when
the United States Supreme Court held, in Weisman, that a public school
system could not constitutionally arrange for a member of the clergy to
deliver a prayer at a middle school graduation ceremony in Providence,
Rhode Island.' Though the Court's pronouncements in Weisman were
ringing and unequivocal, 9 observers critical of the result in the case

6. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down school requirement that students, at discretion
of school officials, recite a prayer composed by the state) ("It is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as
part of a religious program carried on by government"). Id.
7. Included in this category should be, at least, the decisions in McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). The
substantial popular opposition to each of these decisions is well documented. See infra note
9.
8. 112 S.Ct. at 2649.
9. "It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.'" Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (citations omitted). "The degree of school involvement
here made it clear that the graduation prayers bore the imprint of the State and thus put
school-age children who objected in an untenable position." Id. at 2657. "One timeless
lesson [of the Establishment Clause] is that if citizens are subjected to state-sponsored
religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of
inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people." Id. at 2658. "What
to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever
respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or
dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy." Id.
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followed in their forbears' footsteps"0 and chose to search for gaps or
limitations in the decisional language that could leave room for an
argument that some organized prayer was still permitted in the nation's
public schools.
The Weisman critics' search was eased and encouraged by an
anomalous federal appeals court decision, Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District," which addressed the particular question whether
a public school graduation prayer was permissible where it resulted from
school implementation of a majority vote of the graduating class. 2 The
Fifth Circuit had held, after Weisman had been appealed to the Supreme
Court but before certiorari was granted, 3 that such a prayer did not
violate the Establishment Clause. At the time the Supreme Court
decided Weisman, a petition for certiorari was pending in Jones.4 The
Court granted the petition, vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and
remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Lee v. Weisman."" The Fifth Circuit's opinion on remand essentially warmed over
its previous holding, but cloaked it in Weisman garb, saying that the

The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be conducted at
a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we have found, young
graduates who object are induced to conform. No holding by this Court suggest
that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious
exercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
Id. at 2661.
10.

See ROBERT ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE FmST

AMENDMENT 107-13 ("firestorm of protest across the nation" followed the ruling in Engel
in June 1962, followed by attempts to enact a federal constitutional amendment to override
the decision). Professor Alley gives detailed accounts of the political battles that ensued
after each of the Court's major school prayer decisions. See, e.g., id. at 107-26 (aftermath
of Engel and Schempp); id. at 95-98 (fallout from Everson); id. at 169-80 (1970s attempts
at amending the religion clauses).
11. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Jones F), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 3020
(1992), on remand, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Jones IF), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950
(1993).
12. 977 F.2d at 964-65. The court in Jones was not presented with actual prayers or
student votes to have prayers, but rather only with a dispute over the facial validity of a
school board resolution expressly permitting students to choose by ballot whether to have
prayers at graduation, Id.
13. The petition for certiorariin Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014, was filed December 21,
1990. 59 U.S.L.W. 3464 (1991). The petition was granted on March 18, 1991. 59 U.S.L.W.
3635 (1991).
14. The petition in Jones was filed August 20, 1991, as No. 91-310. 60 U.S.L.W. 3161
(1991).

15.

60 U.S.L.W. 3878 (June 29, 1992).
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student-led prayer passed 16muster under each of several available
Establishment Clause tests.
By early 1993 the American Center for Law and Justice ("ACLJ"),
affiliated with the Reverend Edmund G. "Pat" Robertson's Christian
Broadcasting Network and the Regent (formerly CBN) Law School,17
had drafted and circulated a "bulletin""8 to every school superintendent
in the nation 9 which, in the name of providing "helpful ...

informa-

tion,"2 proclaimed in a shameless distortion of the caselaw that Jones
II was now controlling: "Students have the right to include an invocation and benediction in their graduation exercises."" The bulletin
explained,
In [Weisman], the Supreme Court held only that it violates the
Establishment Clause for school officials to invite clergy to give prayers
Indeed, following [Weisman], at least one
at commencement ....
[flederal [a]ppeals [clourt has ruled that "a majority of students can do

16. See discussion infra at 1107-12.
17. The ACLJ was incorporated as a Virginia not-for-profit corporation under the name
of its corporate parent, the Christian Broadcasting Network. CBN's president and chief
executive officer is the Rev. Edmund G. "Pat" Robertson. ACLJ chief counsel is Jay A.
Sekulow, Esq., whose article on student religious speech in public schools appears
elsewhere in this issue. Jay Alan Sekulow, James Henderson & John Tuskey, Proposed
Guidelinesfor Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 1016 (1995).

18. American Center for Law and Justice, untitled document dated "School Year 199293," on file at Mercer Law Review and with the author [hereinafter "ACLJ Bulletin"], at
2 ("The purpose of this bulletin.. ."). The document was first seen by the American Civil
Liberties Union of Virginia on April 4, 1993.
19. "This bulletin has been sent for educational purposes to each of the 14,658 public
school superintendents in the United States." ACLJ Bulletin, supra note 18, at 2.
20. ACLJ Bulletin, supra note 18, at 1. The ACLJ renewed its endeavor more recently
with a mass-mailing letter to school superintendents dated March 21, 1994, that said it
was intended "to address the questions and concerns of school officials regarding the issues
of prayer at graduation ceremonies..." American Center for Law and Justice, open letter
to school superintendents from Jay A. Sekulow, Chief Counsel, March 21, 1994 [hereinafter
"1994 ACLJ Letter"]. The letter claimed, without mention of Gearon and with only
perfunctory citation of ACLU of New Jersey v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., No.
93-5368, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir. June 25, 1993) (unpublished), that "a public school district
can allow student-led, student-initiated prayer at graduation ceremonies without an
Establishment Clause problem." 1994 ACLJ Letter at 4. The letter was apparently
distributed before the ringing repudiation of majority-vote student prayer in Harris v. Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994). Given the present state of the law, the
usefulnesss of the ACLJ's advice is debatable.
21. 1994 ACMJ Letter at 4.
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what the State acting on its own cannot do to incorporate prayer in
public high school graduation ceremonies."2

The bulletin also advised that "within the context of a valedictorian,
salutatorian, or other address, students may initiate prayers, Christian
testimonies or other religious speech,"23 and indicated that "[situdents,

community groups and area churches are entitled to sponsor events,
Thus, avenues still exist after
such as baccalaureate ceremonies ....
[Weisman] for voluntary yearly baccalaureate ceremonies [at school]."24

On February 5, 1993, the Loudoun County school superintendent, in
consultation with the local school board, distributed to principals of the
county's four public high schools a memorandum he had written, based
on the ACLJ Bulletin, which purported to set out "guidelines ... with
regard to baccalaureate [services and] prayer at graduation .... .2r
Though the superintendent later testified that the central school
administration left decisions about graduation ceremonies to "the
individual schools,"26 he also stated that his own "personal position"
was that "having prayer at school graduation is an appropriate vehicle
for solemnization" because it "acknowledg[es] a power beyond ourselves." 7 Accordingly he devised a simple scheme parallel to the one
at issue in Jones, i.e., official implementation of the results of a simple
majority vote of members of the senior class on whether to have a prayer

22. ACLJ Bulletin, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis in original), quoting Jones 11, 977
F.2d at 972.
23. ACLJ Bulletin, supra note 18, at 3.
24. Id. Baccalaureate services, which typically are prayer services in advance of formal
commencement exercises, present official involvement problems somewhat similar to those
familiar to readers of Weisman. These ceremonies, where privately held, are less likely to
pose Establishment Clause problems than are prayers offered at official graduation
ceremonies. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141 (1993Xpublic school had no Establishment Clause basis for refusing, and violated free
speech guarantee by declining, to rent facilities to religious group for private after-school
use on same terms as were available to other users). Indeed, where the facts permit no
inference of official sponsorship or promotion of the event, a baccalaureate or other private
prayer service is as noncontroversial absent Lamb's Chapel as it is after that decision.
Because the ACLJ Bulletin, and the local school board action at issue in Gearon, attempted
first and foremost to set forth circumstances when prayers could and should be permitted
at official graduation ceremonies, the discussion in this article focuses on graduation prayer
itself.
25. Gearon Joint Stipulation, supra note 4, at 1-2. Prayer, delivered by a member of
the clergy, was historically a staple at graduation ceremonies in Loudoun County's schools.
Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 1.
27. Deposition of Edgar B. Hatrick, III, at 15, cited in Gearon, Plaintiffs Counter-.
Statement of Material Facts at 1.
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at graduation.28 Meanwhile, also in February 1993, two members of
the county school board drafted a resolution to "express support for
prayer at graduation," a statement that they "figured ... would be
picked up by the media" and that "most of the community would see
.... .' The unusual resolution 0 ultimately passed the full board that
April, to the wide publicity its patrons had expressly intended.31
Principals at the county's high schools proceeded to hold student
assemblies for their senior classes at which the superintendent's
memorandum was read aloud and the voting arrangement presented.
From there school officials proceeded to orchestrate the vote.' The
procedure was repeated with minor variations at each school, e.g., as to
who called the meetings, or whether a teacher was the only speaker at
the meeting where the plan was presented. Some might think it
significant, for instance, that senior class officers at one high school
asked their principal, rather than the other way around, for a meeting
on the prayer issue, or that senior class officers, acting with apparent
unanimity, put the matter to a class vote themselves. 3
The ensuing votes at all four high schools were lopsided in support of
prayer.' At Loudoun County High School, the vote was 125 in favor,
46 opposed and 4 recorded as "other."8 At Loudoun Valley High
School, the vote was 133 in favor and 33 opposed. 6 At Broad Run the
vote was 145 to 46, and at Park View the vote was 171 to 33.3
After the votes, school administrators guided students as to choice of text
and reviewed the proposed prayers in advance, in particular to observe
the superintendent's admonition that any prayer was to be "non-

28.
29.

Gearon Joint Stipulation, eupra note 4, at 3.
Id. at 4.

30. A school board member testified that the board's typical fare of resolutions was
"national teachers' week ... principals' week ... vocational education week. That's it ....

In the seven years I've been on the board we have never passed a resolution of that nature
(indicating)." d. at 7.
31. id. at 4.
32. Id. at 30 (Loudoun County High School); Gearon Joint Stipulation, supra note 4,
at 14-15 (Broad Run High School); Id. at 22-23 (Park View High School); Id. at 38 (Loudoun
Valley High School).

33. Gearon Joint Stipulation, supra note 4, at 38-39 (Loudoun Valley High School).
34. The evidence by and large was, and this Article assumes, that school officials did
not directly attempt to control the outcome of the vote. However, as should be clear from
the discussion which follows, control of the election results is beside the point.
35. Gearon Joint Stipulation, supra note 4, at 32.
36. Id. at 39.
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id. at 26.
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sectarian and non-proselytizing",3 9 even in one instance changing the
text at the last minute following the onset of litigation.' At Loudoun
County High School, the county's oldest and largest, school officials
handed out and collected ballots for the prayer vote, and afterwards
made most if not all of the decisions about the prayer itself: who would
recite it, when in the graduation ceremony it would be given, and even
what it would and would not say. The Loudoun Valley High School
principal testified that if he had had doubts about whether the prayer
to be offered was "non-sectarian" and "non-proselytizing," he would have
sent the student who posed the question41 to a pastor and would have
"taken the pastor's word" for the answer.
As soon as plaintiffs could be found from the affected community, a
preliminary injunction was sought and obtained in federal district
42
court.
The county appealed immediately to the Fourth Circuit and
was granted a stay of the injunction almost without a word. Graduation ceremonies in the Loudoun County high schools then took place

39. Gearon Joint Stipulation, supra note 4, at 36. The phrases "non-sectarian" and
"non-proselytizing" were first used in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983)
(prayer at state legislative sessions), further discussed at infra note 63 and accompanying
text.
The record in Gearon reflected a peculiar if predictable breakdown in the official
consensus when it came to just what was "non-sectarian" and "non-proselytizing." The
factual stipulations in the case tell the story:
The [county high school principals] have varying determinations as to whether
certain portions of the statements delivered at the 1993 Loudoun County [public
high school] graduation ceremonies were in fact non-sectarian and non-proselytizing. Mr. Starzenski [of Loudoun County High School] believes that use of the
phrase "now let us bow our heads and give thanks" has relevance to prayer, and
would question whether or not this would be allowed.... Four of his professional
colleagues do not view this quote as being proselytizing or sectarian .... Mr.
Starzenski would not question "Almighty" as non-sectarian and non-proselytizing,
... but [the other principals] would .... [All] would question "Dear Heavenly
Father".. . which [a graduation speaker] used... [Two officials] would question
the use of "Amen" [and three] would not ....
Gearon Joint Stipulation, supra note 4, at 44.
40. GearonJoint Stipulation, supra note 4, at 36 (Loudoun County High School). That
school's principal also instructed the student giving the prayer to have the commencement
audience stand during the recitation. Id.
41. Id. at 42.
42. Preliminary Injunction, Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., No. 93-730-A (E.D. Va.
June 21, 1993) (Bryan, J.).
43. Order on Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd.,
Docket No. 93-1770 (4th Cir. June 23, 1993) (Widener, J.). ("We are of opinion the motion
is well taken .... With the concurrence of Judge Hamilton, Judge Phillips dissenting").

Id.
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with varying degrees of religiosity." The interlocutory appeal was
dismissed by stipulation, and the case proceeded through discovery and
summary judgment in the district court. It was submitted to Judge
Bryan in late 1993 4 by agreement of the parties for a paper "trial" on
the ultimate issues, i.e., for findings and conclusions on stipulated facts
and documentary evidence without an oral hearing.
Defendants contended, in the district court's words, that "the remarks
delivered were student-initiated, student-written and student-delivered,
and, therefore, lacked the pervasive government involvement condemned
in [Weisman] and [Lemon]. They rel[iedl heavily on [Jones II]. They
also assert[ed] that the students' purpose in the remarks was to
'solemnize' the graduation ceremonies, and that such a purpose does not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause; and that the prayer at issue
neither advances nor inhibits religion."4 6 Plaintiffs' arguments were
essentially that Weisman applied; that Jones was wrongly decided; and
that "student-initiated" and "student-led" prayers at Loudoun County's
graduations were no less violative of the separation command than the
prayers given by clergy in Weisman. As the district court put it, the
heart of the plaintiffs' case was that "state sponsorship of a graduation
ceremony cannot be insulated from government entanglement [with
religion] by delegating to a majority of the members of the graduating
class the decision whether prayers are to be included."47
Plaintiffs used three local expert witnesses: a school psychologist, a
college professor of religion, and a Conservative Jewish rabbi. The
expert testimony was to the effect that the prayers actually given at the
graduation ceremonies were essentially Christian, regardless of their

44. At Loudoun County High School's 1993 graduation, the prayer began, "Almighty,
" Gearon, 844 F. Supp.
Please watch over the future of these young men and women ....
at 1101. At Park View High School, the prayer began, "Dear Heavenly Father, [wie thank
you for the blessings you have bestowed upon us which have brought us together to
celebrate this wonderful occasion .

. . ."

Id.

At Loudoun Valley High School, the

ceremony's opening message-whether it was immediately recognizable as a prayer is
difficult to say-ended with, "Let us reflect in our special ways upon the memories ....
Now let us bow our heads and give thanks to all those who have guided, supported and
[led] us to the point [at] which we are today." There followed a period of silence, after
which the opening remarks concluded, "Best of luck ..... The closing remarks at the same
school included the exhortation, "Let our faith guide us through these lessons of life ....
May the class of 1993 be blessed with a properous and successful future." Id. at 1101-02.
45. Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1098. "Although the matters initially giving rise to the
action concerned the 1993 spring graduation, which obviously has passed, the defendants
seek to follow and the plaintiffs resist following the same procedures in the future. No
party suggests the controversy is moot." Id.
46. Id.

47. Id. at 1099.
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supposed "non-sectarian" cast; that for non-Christians "participation in
even 'non-denominational' and 'non-proselytizing' prayer would be
violative of specific [commands] of their faiths";' that "the effect of the
[prayers actually given] is to advance the religion of those who believe
in a [Christian] deity at the expense of non-believers, Jews, or other nonChristians";49 that there exist religious traditions, in particular Eastern
ones like Buddhism, in which "prayer" in the sense of the Loudoun
County student votes is simply not possible;s' and that acute peer

48. Gearon, Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and Conclusions on the Unconstitutionality
of Graduation Prayer Per Se, at 9.
49. 844 F. Supp. at 1102. The article by Sekulow, et al., supra note 17, at 333, makes
much of the failure of the opinion to include the bracketed word "Christian" here. Courts
make slips like this often, and the Gearon opinion as a whole fails to support an argument
that this elision betrays a motive to destroy or disrespect religious belief in the name of
upholding a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. 844 F. Supp. at 1102 ("in any
event, even if defendants could persuade the court that the graduation prayer [in this case]
had a clearly secular purpose and [in its effect] neither advanced nor inhibited religion,
they would not prevail here. As noted above, the extent of state entanglement with
religion on these facts requires the court to find an Establishment Clause violation."). Id.
50. See Declaration of Francisca Cho Bantly, Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1102. The
particulars of the declaration are instructive. An assistant professor of Buddhist studies
in the Georgetown University theology department, Bantly attested that
[fin the United States, which is predominantly Protestant in religious culture, the
call for "non-denominational" devotion taxes non-Protestant, and particularly nonChristian, faiths far more than Protestantism. Many American Protestants do not
have far to go, in form or nature of devotion, to reach the "non-denominational"
mode. The same cannot be said of a Muslim, a Jew, a Sikh, or evan a Catholic,
for whom the "non-denominational" requirement serves as a prohibition on actions
or words at the heart of their religious observance (e.g., praying in a foreign
tongue, or taking prescribed actions) ....
For some non-western faiths, the
concept of "non-denominational prayer" is an oxymoron. Thus, for example, the
closest things that appear in certain non-theistic traditions, e.g., Therav~da
Buddhism, are certain speech acts such as meditational recitations, mantras, and
bodhisattva vows, none of which can possibly be stripped of their "Buddhist"
nature. An adherent of this faith can no more give a "non-denominational prayer"
having any meaning within his or her own faith, than one can invoke Buddha by
making the sign of the cross .... [A Buddhist statement of position at a world
religious parliament] objected to the fact that western or Christian speakers
"define[d] all religions as religions of God .... The founder of Buddhism was not
God or a god, [but] a human being who attained full Enlightenment through
meditation ....
Unlike those who believe in God who is separate from us,
[Buddhists believe that salvation and enlightenment] is available to all through
the removal of defilements and delusion and a life of meditation .... ." I, like
many of my colleagues, ... view with concern official public forays into the
religious arena ....
When unschooled public officials get involved in the
determination of what should or should not take place by way of religious worship
at public events, the result is almost invariably exclusionary vis-d-vis members of
minority faiths .... [The "Dear Heavenly Father" and "Almighty prayers given

1106
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pressure among adolescents, coupled with the universal awareness
among students of the importance of high school graduation as an event
in their lives, makes dissent from the majority's will difficult at best. 1
Plaintiffs maintained that for a student who did not share the
prevailing religious view that by definition was embodied in the vote to
have a prayer, there were no satisfactory alternatives. "Opting out" of
participation in the group prayer, i.e., by not attending the ceremony at
all, was a wholly unpalatable choice. So was disrupting the proceeding
in some way "so as to give witness to [the student's] objections and
principles, and to avoid compelled speech," or "standing mutely in
violation of [his or] her principles and beliefs, being coerced to participate in prayer.' 2 Plaintiffs argued further that the very importance
of the occasion 3 compounded the problem for dissenting or nonreligionists, including those in the audience and those who might
otherwise choose or be chosen to fill roles of leadership in the proceedings."'

at Loudoun County high school graduations) reflect a theistic faith. They are thus
inaccessible to a member of a non-theistic faith such as Buddhism .... The'
problem is not solved by manipulating language (e.g., dropping the words "God"
or "in your name we pray. . ."), since the religious content and reference remain
unchanged.
Id.
51. The district court chose to strike the school psychologist's declaration from the
record, on the ground that "[a]n expert's testimony is not needed to establish the effects of
peer pressure on adolescents, or the importance, symbolically or otherwise, of the
graduation ceremony." Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1102. On the psychological dimensions of
the problem, see generally Ted W. Harrison, Note, The Establishment Clause and
Developmental Psychology: An Analysis of Public School Graduation Prayer, 4 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 333 (1994).
52. Gearon, Plaintiffs' Counter-Statement of Material Facts at 28-29.
53. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659 ("[tjhe importance of the event is the point the
school district... relties] upon to argue that a formal prayer ought to be permitted, but
it becomes one of the principal reasons why their argument must fail.").
54. "Undeniably it is an honor for a student to be chosen to make a presentation at
graduation. Were merely 'secular inspirational remarks' at issue, all articulate students
would be on an equal footing to volunteer or be chosen to present such remarks. But if
what is at issue is prayer in one form or another, it is only students who see fit to pray,
at all or in this secular context, who will be so honored .... This is not only grossly unfair
to secular students, but unconstitutional under settled law. The government cannot
'make(] adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the ... community.'"
Gearon, Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, at 17-18 (quoting
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2665 n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
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WEISMAN AND JONES II

The district court's opinion in Gearon followed Weisman to the letter,
faithfully adhering'in particular to several points of the Supreme Court's
reasoning that some commentators have overlooked. First, as the
Weisman majority understood, a prayer formally offered as part of a
graduation ceremony cannot simultaneously be "an essential and
profound recognition of divine authority" for the majority of the
graduation audience on the one hand, and on the other a de minimis
intrusion on the freedom of conscience of a dissenter.55 Second, as
Justice Blackmun's concurrence (for himself, Justice Stevens, and Justice
O'Connor) added, while coercion of individual religious belief is sufficient
to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is not a necessary
condition." And third, as pointed out in Justice Souter's concurrence
(which Justices Stevens and O'Connor, though not Justice Blackmun,
joined), a claim that the prayer at issue is non-sectarian should be of no
consequence to the decision. Justice Souter investigated the legislative
history of the Establishment Clause and concluded that it was intended
to prohibit more than just preferential treatment of one sect over
another, and indeed was created as a bar to government actions that
"aid all religions."57
Measured against these principles of Jones II, decided after the
Weisman Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's own previous ruling that a
majority-vote prayer was permissible, is disingenuous in several
respects. it claims to recognize the importance and the state sponsorship of graduation," and then centrally holds that a majority of
students can, without violating the Constitution, manipulate this statesponsored event to coerce their fellows into participation in their
religious exercise."' The decision turns a blind eye to the government's
sponsorship of the graduation ceremony, a fact it earlier acknowledged,
and instead pretends that the event is a "community" experience that
"people should not be surprised [is] affected by community standards.' °
55. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659 (opinion of the Court).
56. Id. at 2664 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973))
('proof of coercion... [is] not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment
Clause."). Id.
57. Id. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
58. 'Jones II, 977 F.2d at 966 ("the Resolution represents Clear Creek's judgment that
society benefits if people attach importance to graduation."). Id.
59. Id. at 971.
60. Id. at 972, comparing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (criminal laws of general application reflect "community standards" and
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The nub of the Jones II distortion of Weisman is its insistence on
limiting and then breaking down the Supreme Court's parameters for
the constitutionality of"a prayer to be used in a formal religious exercise
which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend." The
Jones II opinion first reduces the Weisman principles to an inventory of
separate indicia of state involvement, e.g., a state decision that an
invocation should be given; a state choice of prayer giver; and a degree
of state control over prayer content. This unbundling is unobjectionable
in itself, but the opinion then strains to distinguish between the
Weisman and Jones fact patterns along each of these axes, as follows:
first, the resolution in Jones "does not necessarily charge government
with the decision of whether to include invocations";"' second, the
resolution precludes anyone but a student volunteer from delivering the
invocations and "says nothing of government involvement in the
selection"; 2 and third, the school district exercises less control over the
text than the Providence school system did in Weisman-it "does not
solicit invocations ... [it] only forbids [its] schools from accepting
sectarian or proselytizing invocations;" and it uses the terms "nonsectarian" and "non-proselytizing," which, unlike the "pamphlet full of
invocation suggestions" said to be at issue in Weisman, "enhance
solemnization and minimize advancement of religion'--almost as though
the two were mutually exclusive.
This rationale presents three immediate problems. One is the
implication that "non-sectarian" and "non-proselytizing" prayer is the
same as no prayer. This tendency to exacerbate the mischief of Marsh
v. Chambers' is lamentable and as difficult to defend as the Marsh

need not yield to individual behavior preferences even where those preferences are based
on religious conviction) Id. (later overridden in part by Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) ("RFRA"), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000b.
See S. Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1993 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1893 (RFRA was expressly designed to restore the "compelling interest" test Smith
had abrogated with regard to government justifications of any substantial burdens on
individual free exercise of religion).
61. Id. at 970.
62. Id. at 971.
63. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Establishment Clause did not prohibit hiring of state-paid
chaplains by the Nebraska state legislature or the delivery of prayers by clergy at state
legislative sessions). The Court in Marsh did not discuss the Lemon test or, for that
matter, engage in extended analysis of any of its other precedents. Instead, the Court
reasoned solely from the duration of the practice that it was to be deemed permissible. The
decision has been roundly criticized, not least for its convenient suggestion that there was
such a thing as "civil religion," or a civil religion, the practices of which were constitutionally permissible and to be differentiated from others, presumably vested with truer or greater
religious significance, that the Establishment Clause did not permit to be observed,
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decision itself has been. Moreover, Jones turned a blind eye, after
Weisman as much as before, to the existence of religious traditions other
than the one preferred in the prayers at issue--even though proof of the
existence of other religious paths ought not to be needed to show that
prayer is inconsistent with the Constitution's mandate of religious
neutrality. The Gearon plaintiffs, conscious of this difficulty in Jones,
presented undisputed evidence that some religions consider prayer, as
conventionally understood or. practiced by Jews, Christians, and
Muslims, to be incompatible with their own beliefs and practices."
A second defect of Jones HI is that it miscontrues.and misapplies the
Supreme Court's religious purpose test." The Jones H opinion cites
Lynch v. Donnelly" for the "acknowledgement" that "solemnization is
a legitimate secular purpose of ceremonial prayer," and then assumes-and ascribes the assumption to the Court-that any such
purpose completely excludes or neutralizes a religious purpose that may
also be present, and thus satisfies the religious purpose inquiry of
Lemon.
The assumption does not necessarily hold true. The state statute
analyzed in Lemon satisfied the Court's religious purpose test because
the Justices found "no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent
was to advance religion,'s and "nothing here that undermines the
stated legislative intent" to advance only a secular interest.69 The

sponsored or promoted by the state.
64. See Bantly Declaration, supra note 50.
65. 977 F.2d at 967.
66. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
67. 977 F.2d at 966-67 (citing Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989)) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Certainly Allegheny County does not stand for this proposition, or claim that Lynch or
Marsh stands for it. The most that Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Allegheny
County did was to say that her Lynch concurrence had harmonized the result in Marsh
with the endorsement principle by saying the legislative prayer in Marsh "serve[s], in the
only way reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purpose!] of solemnizing
public occasions.... ." Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Whatever we may think of this
reasoning, it does not equate to the proposition pretended for it in Jones II, i.e., that the
articulation of any secular purpose for state action suffices to negate or neutralize any
religious purpose that may also be evident. See discussion infra. Indeed, even the Jones
court was forced to acknowledge that "a law may pass Lemon's secular-purpose test ... yet
still be stricken as an unconstitutional establishment under another test mandated by the
Court." 977 F.2d at 967.
68. 403 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
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"moment of silence" statute challenged in Wallace v. Jaffree0 was held
to have "no secular purpose" and to be "entirely motivated by a purpose
to advance religion,"71 and therefore the Jaffree Court had no occasion
to gauge what level of secular purpose would suffice to withstand the
religious purpose test. The Court held that "even though [state action)
that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first
criterion" of the Lemon test, such action must have a "clearly secular
purpose."' This reasoning simply does not equate to the broadly stated
proposition of Jones II that the presence, proved or attributed, of any
secular purpose for the contested state action automatically precludes
further inquiry.
However, even assuming "solemnization" to be an adequate secular
purpose, and assuming a court reviewing a graduation prayer for
constitutionally could impute such purpose to a school board without
evidence that the board had articulated such a purpose, the facts in
Gearon show that a court may still be presented with a religious purpose
problem. The Loudoun County School Board passed a resolution which

70. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Jaffree, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), and Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating Kentucky statute requiring Ten Commandments' display in public school classrooms), are the three principal post-Lemon decisions
applying Lemon's religious purpose test.
71. Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).
72. Id. Note the language in Jaffree that
[t]he addition of "or voluntary prayer" [to the statutory text during the amendment process under challenge] indicates that the State intended to characterize
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent with the
established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete
neutrality toward religion.
Id. at 60.
In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding state subsidy, through tax
deductions, of certain expenses of education, including private and parochial schooling), the
Court was bolder in saying that a secular purpose the state "could conclude" exists would
be sufficient to satisfy the Lemon religious purpose test. But even Mueller did not limit
the Lemon purpose prong to situations where no secular legislative purpose was discernible
even in the abstract. See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 ("The Court has invalidated
legislation br governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but
only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,586-87
(1987) (invalidating state statutory mandate that "creation science" be taught in any public
school where evolutionary theory was taught) ("it is required that the statement of [secular]
purpose be sincere and not a sham"); North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal
Foundation v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1150 (4th Cir. 1991) (invalidating judge's practice
of opening sessions of court with prayer) ("it is not required that the primary purpose of
the action be secular," but "controlling caselaw suggests that an act so intrinsically
religious as prayer cannot meet, or at least would have difficulty meeting, the secular
purpose prong of the Lemon test").
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expressly recognized "the deeply held religious beliefs of many of the
students of Loudoun County Public Schools and those many citizens of
Loudoun County," and resolved "to encourage the continuation of the
traditions" of baccalaureate services and graduation prayer.7" The
resolution, however it may have sought to enrich, ennoble, or "solemnize"
local graduation ceremonies, amounted to an express preference for
religious observance, and a particular one, at a state function. It would
be worthy of the proverbial ostrich for a court to retreat from the school
board's plain language, in a case like this, into a surmise that a secular
"solemnization" purpose, alone or in the main, animated the board's vote,
or that such a purpose neutralized or cancelled out whatever impermissible motive the board also had to advance or promote the inculcation of
religious dogma in its students. This, it is thankfully observed, the
Gearon court did not do.
A third and especially obvious intellectual deficiency of Jones is that
the decision pretends that group prayer at official school functions is
acceptable, under any and all Establishment Clause standards or
theories, so long as it is "initiated" and "led" by students.74 Two flaws
require mention here. First, the term "student-initiated" is a pretense,
since on the facts of Jones school officials decide that there should be a
vote in the first place, and since the voting process itself is suspect ab
initio as a presumptive abrogation of the individual liberties of religion,
expression and association of any dissenters, visible or not.75 Second,

73. Resolution, Loudoun County School Board, April 6, 1993 (cited in Gearon, 844 F.
Supp. at 1100).
74., See Jaeger v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831 (11th Cir. 1989)
(prayers at public high school football games violate the Establishment Clause under an
endorsement test, not merely a coercion theory, even though student clubs designated the
person to give the prayer, and even though the prayer was extracurricular and "outside the
classroom," because the "extracurricular activities were school[-]sponsored and so closely
identified with the school program"). Id.
Even the Fifth Circuit has treated the matter differently in cases decided before Jones.
See Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating Louisiana state statute
authorizing public school teachers to ask for student volunteers to offer prayers and to
recite prayers themselves if no student volunteered), and after it as well. See Doe v.
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993) (disallowing team prayer
recitations led by high school coach before student basketball games; strictly applying test
of Mergens as to whether official supervision of student-initiated prayer was merely
"custodial").
75. Indeed, the degree of visibility of dissent in peer-pressure situations like this one,
see Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659 (effects of peer pressure on adolescents), may well be a
function of the sheer effectiveness of the suppression rather than an indicium of noncoercion. See Harrison, supra note 17.
For that matter, a ruling based on proof that not a single student body member felt
"coerced," assuming persuasive proof to this effect could ever be offered, would only
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the term "student-led" forgets what is right under its nose, i.e., that an
audience, gathered by authority of the school for a state purpose, is
being asked or expected to participate in the religious exercise. This is
what Weisman at its core recognizes as prohibited official coercion of
private religious belief."6
II.

SPEECH AND RELIGION: THE ANTI-SEPARATIONIST CRITIQUE OF
WEISMAN
The best that can be said of the post-Weisman wave of pro-prayer
criticism, including Mr. Sekulow's article elsewhere in this issue, is that
it is highly alert-perhaps more alert than was the Weisman Court--to
the free speech ramifications of the separation command when the
context is student religious speech in the public schools. The immediate
question this critique raises, however, is relevancy, i.e., whether the
objections or fears are colorable given the Court's commands. In his
article Mr. Sekulow makes a number of basically non-controversial
proposals about public school students' personal expression, e.g., that
students must not be prevented from saying prayers to themselves in the
cafeteria,7" that student religious groups must not be prevented from
meeting in school facilities outside the instructional day,78 that
students must not be prevented from proselytizing to their fellow
students absent proof of disruption actually present or fairly to be
anticipated under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,79 and that students must not be subject to teacher bias against

illuminate a problem inherent in the coercion test. It would be dangerous indeed for a
court to hold that insulation from coercive effects was the only protection the state was
required to extend in order to satisfy the separation command. Surely settled Establishment Clause doctrine would not permit us to suppose that government, if it wishes to make
officially sponsored religious observances permissible, would need only to impose complete
and permanent religious segregation on its citizens. The insuperable definitional
difficulties, and the specter of societal degradation, that such a supposition presents, ought
to sound their own alarms against too permissive a test for government interference in
private religious affairs.
76. 112 S. Ct. at 1261.
77. See Sekulow et al., supra note 17. See also Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the
American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1123 (1995), at note 19 and
accompanying text (describing falsehood of Rep. Newt Gingrich's account of supposed school
discipline of a student for saying grace over his food).
78. The federal Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(a), (b) (1984), codified this
protection, see Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990), but it was probably present before the enactment. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 271 (1981). Accordingly, neither Shumway, nor Randall,nor Verbena presents a true
conflict between private student religious speech and the endorsement principle.
79. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker is discussed in Sekulow et al., supra note 17.
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their religious beliefs if they happen to express those beliefs, say, in a
writing assignment or an examination answer.s
Mr. Sekulow's complaint with regard to the decision in Gearon, beyond
a general dissatisfaction with judicial enforcements of Weisman, makes
one fair observation: the breadth of the Gearon court's pronouncement
that "permitting prayer" is to be universally forbidden. The matter calls
for some discussion.
The district court adopted the plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact."'
The court held simply, "[A] constitutional violation inherently occurs
when, in a secondary school graduation setting, a prayer is offered
regardless of who makes the decision that the prayer will be given and
who authorizes the actual wording of the remarks." 2 Relying on
Weisman, which in turn rested on cases from Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Townships to Engel v. Vitale," School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 5 Wallace v. Jaffree,86 and Edwards
v. Aquillard,87 the Gearon court felt quite comfortable saying that
[t]o involuntarily subject a [public school] student at such an event [as
his or her high school graduation] to a display of religion that is

80. A favorite hypothetical of Mr. Sekulow's is that of the student who asks his or her
biology teacher to argue theology. See Sekulow et al., supra note 17. The authors imagine
a teacher imposing a grading penalty for the question, "The chances are practically nil that
the simplest life proteins arose by chance-so wasn't this whole thing actually created?"
Id, Edwards v. Aguillard has been argued and decided, of course, but in this as in another
hypothetical situation given in the article-in which a teacher gives a student a lower
grade on his Moby Dick essay because he drew parallels between Melville and the book of
Jonah, rather than between Melville and some secular counterpart-the doctrinal response
is straightforward. If proof can be adduced that such a sanction was actually imposed in
a public school, and was attributable to the religious content of the student's expression,
a speech abridgment claim would seem compelling and hardly worth the anxiety Mr.
Sekulow devotes to it.
81. Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1099, 1102.
82. Id. at 1099.
83. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (using "wall of separation" metaphor from Jefferson's
influential 1802 letter to Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut).
84. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down school requirement that students, at discretion
of school officials, recite a prayer composed by the state) ("[I]t is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as
part of a religious program carried on by government."). Id. at 425.
85. 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). In Schempp, a Pennsylvania law and a Baltimore,
Maryland, city ordinance required schools to begin each day with a reading from the Bible
and a recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The Court acknowledged that "the Bible is worthy
of study for its literary and historic qualities" but insisted that any study of its contents
had to be "presented objectively as part of a secular program of education." Id.
86. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
87. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).

1114

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

offensive or not agreeable to his or her own religion or lack of religion
is to constructively exclude that student from graduation, given the
options the student has [to be absent from graduation, to attend and
be disruptive, or attend and participate regardless of his or her
religious objections]. The Establishment Clause does not permit this to
occur."

The court continued into a second phase of reasoning: "Nor can the
state simply delegate the decision as to a prayer component of that
ceremony to the graduating class." 9
The notion that a person's constitutional rights may be subject to a
majority vote is itself anathema. The graduating classes in Loudoun
County certainly could not have voted to exclude from the ceremonies
persons of a certain race. To be constructively excluded ...because of
one's religion or lack of religion is not a great deal different. To the
extent that [Jones] permits such a delegation, this court respectfully
rejects its reasoning.90

The court in Gearon understood the plaintiffs to have two distinct
arguments, one a per se claim that a formal group prayer as part of a
public school graduation ceremony was coercive of individual religious
belief no matter who gave the prayer, and the other that the extent of
state involvement here-a matter of degree under the third prong of
Lemon 1 -- was greater than the Establishment Clause permitted.
Accordingly, as to relief, the court's order stated that the defendants
"and those in privity with them are permanently enjoined from
permitting prayer in high school graduations in Loudoun County,
Virginia."9 2 The court specifically explained that its ruling that
"permittingprayer at high school graduations ...

is a violation" was

"predicated on the acceptance of the plaintiffs' primary argument. If
only the alternative argument were accepted, obviously a more narrow
injunction would be issued.'
The Gearon court granted precisely the sort of relief required for the
violation complained of, i.e., the state's consignment of a core freedom of
individual belief to the whims of a plebiscite that scarcely deserves the
name. School officials indeed must not be about the business of

88. 844 F. Supp. at 1100.

89. Id. At the outset the Gearon court cited the Third Circuit's opinion in Blackhorse
Pike, supra note 20, for its use of the term "delegate." The principle has since been
resoundingly affirmed in Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994).
90. 844 F. Supp. at 1100.
91. Id.

92. Id. at 1103 (order of the court).
93. Id. at 1102 (emphasis supplied).
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"permitting" the students in their care to abrogate the rights of their
fellows whenever in the exercise of some group mentality they see fit to
do so. Where the wrong complained of is the official sanction of a
religious caste system in a public school, the fact that the castes are
created by majority vote of the student populace in no way justifies their
existence, or excuses from constitutional liability the public officials who
oversaw and implemented the scheme.
Nevertheless, the Gearon court's holding goes too far if it means that
"permitting prayer" is unconstitutional in literally all circumstances,
from affirmative advance grants of official permission for student prayer
at graduation all the way to failure to stop a spontaneous prayer or
other religious utterance by students if or while it occurs at the event.
If it is true for all cases that "a constitutional violation inherently occurs
when ...

a prayer is offered,'

one may wonder whether the pro-

nouncement is to mean, e.g., that if a student speaker at graduation-whose speech is entirely unreviewed and free of conditions imposed
by school officials in advance--engages in a personal, though publicly
displayed, religious activity or expression, the school is obliged to make
an interruption in mid-sentence or terminate the display forcibly no
matter what the resulting disruption and embarrassment. The question
may be an idle one, for it is difficult to imagine a court decision holding
school officials to such a duty under the Establishment Clause.' On
the other hand, the scenario points up the larger problem of what
individual student speech is protected in a public school, and what is the
scope of school prerogatives to control or censor that speech whether or
not its content happens to be religious.
For at least some public school contexts outside the majority-vote
group prayer cases, the state's Establishment Clause duty to avoid the
endorsement or coercion of student religious belief should probably not
be formulated quite as it was in Gearon. As noted, the Gearon "no
permitting prayer" formulation could theoretically be construed to
require school systems to bar a student speaker-assuming he or she is
selected without regard to his or her religion and assuming his or her
speech is unreviewed in advance--from saying a prayer or otherwise
94. Id. at 1099.

95. It is devoutly to be wished that the same courts might invalidate official censorship
of this kind under the speech clause where the speech was "controversial" for reasons other
than its religious bent. See, e.g., Broussard v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526
(E.D. Va. 1991) (upholding school decision to suspend seventh-grader for indecency for
wearing to school a rock concert souvenir T-shirt which read "Drugs Suck").
96. The nature, scope and degree of advance review of student speech by school officials
is an important variable here: the equation will change upon proof, for instance, that
school officials have insisted on review for content in other respects. See Gearon Joint
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engaging in religious speech as part of the personal utterance the school
has given him or her discretion to compose. Indeed, the "no permitting"
language could, if strained sufficiently, make it impermissible to allow
individual prayer that is not meant to lead or be shared by the group.
There is little doubt even among strict separationists, and the proposition seems noncontroversial, that such suppressions would achieve
nothing for the Establishment Clause and would violate free speech and
free exercise in the bargain.
Some of the opinion's arguable overreaching may be traced to the
plaintiffs' submissions in the rough and tumble of litigation. They put
forward their cause in passages like these: "Plaintiffs respectfully, but
urgently, request the court to adjudicate [the question] whether prayer
can be presented at public school graduations, regardless of by whom or
by whose ostensible authority . . .;97 "the offering of prayer as part of
public high school graduations violates the [F]irst [Almendment"; 8 and
the pertinent constitutional considerations render irrelevant: (1) the
status or identity of the person by whom the prayer is given, (2) the
authority pursuant to which it is ostensibly given, (3) the decision-

making procedure whereby it is determined that prayer shall be given

or who shall give the prayer, (4) the content of the prayer, and (5) the
extent to which school authorities are actually involved in determining
the content of the prayer;"

and "[situdent-initiated" graduation prayer is unconstitutional under Lee
v. Weisman, ...

graduation prayer offered by authority of majority

student vote "runs head-on into the mandate of [Weisman],"... and is
impermissible. °° Some of the plaintiffs' suggested injunction language
asked the court to bar "defendants ...

permanently from causing,

permitting, or facilitating the presentation of prayer at public school
graduations.""'

Stipulation, supra note 4, at 20, 28, 36, 40 (principals' statements that they reviewed
speeches in advance and directed changes in content). The same would be true of proof
that the school reviewed a student's proposed remarks in advance and censored his or her
ideas in other respects while affirmatively approving or encouraging the prayer material;
or that the school selected or caused the selection of a student as graduation speaker with
an eye on the likelihood that the result would be an attempt to present a religious
spectacle or lead the commencement audience in a religious observance.
97. Gearon,Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Introduction
at 4.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 11-12 (citing Friedmann v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., No. C93-4052
(N.D. Iowa 1993)) (unpublished order).
101. Id. at 14.
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The Gearon plaintiffs did not intend for their church-state separation
advocacy to result in a restraint of otherwise protected speech, and the
decision that resulted, properly construed, worked no such hardship. For
the ruling in Gearon to work satisfactorily, it should be understood to
mean, more or less, a ban on the knowing grant of official permission for
group prayer as a part of the ceremonial design. This amounts to an
exception, not difficult to make, for individual student speech that is
truly free of the taint of official sanction or promotion. Tempered by this
limitation, the core prohibition of Gearon-and now of the other
decisions that have repudiated Jones,American Civil Liberties Union of
New Jersey v. Blackhorse Pike Regional School District"°2 and Harris
v. Joint School District No. 241 '0 -will operate, at the least, against
official permission to any public school student or students to order or
direct the religious belief or practice of others at an event that is
sponsored by, or in a manner implemented or approved in advance by,
school officials.
Nevertheless, even under a rule thus described, there are situations
where school officials' special acknowledgment or encouragement of
students' freedom to "initiate" prayer at graduation, without more, may
raise a prima facie suggestion that the encouragement is religiously
motivated under the first prong of Lemon, or amounts to an endorsement
under Allegheny County, an entanglement under Lemon or a coercion &
la Weisman, to whatever extent any of those standards applies. An
instance in point is the heavily attended press conference given by
members of the governing body and the school board of Henrico County,
Virginia, at the start of the graduation planning season after Gearon
was decided, in which the officials railed en masse against the ruling and
made special efforts to let the county's public school students know they
had the "right" to initiate prayers at their graduation ceremonies.0 4
Courts presented with such evidence should hold school systems to a
burden to produce at least some proof of legitimate non-religious
motivation in order to satisfy the secular purpose command of Lemon,
Stone, Jaffree, and Aguillard.

102. No. 93-5368, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir. June 25, 1993) (unpublished); see alsosupra note
20.
103. 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994).
104. See Supervisors OK Henrico Prayers,RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 24, 1994,
at A-1 (quoting county school board chairman James B. Donati, Jr., as saying, "We want
to let the students know that it is their constitutional right that they can have a
spontaneous prayer at any time they choose," and attributing to him the additional
comment that "spontaneous" means "however they are led"). Id.

1118

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Moreover, the student speech rationale has limits necessarily set by
the Establishment Clause, and in this regard the Sekulow approach
tends toward some overreaching of its own. Several examples arise from
the rhetoric itself. First, the desideratum "allowing private religious
speech at public schools""" covers a multitude of potential sins. The
speech protection available to purely private, individual religious
expression and observance should be beyond question." e But the
phrase just quoted is so lacking in particulars for the terms "private"
and "allow" that adoption of the dictum as a per se rule could lead to
absurd results, e.g., a decision requiring schools to let student missionary groups take over student assemblies, without limiting school
discretion to disallow "private" student speech of the kind found
objectionable in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.°7 If proprayer critics of Weisman complain that school authorities "overseparate," invading the purely private sphere in the name of Establishment Clause compliance,' separationists are just as concerned lest
public schools overreact to talk of "allowing" group prayer at official
functions and thereby violate their duty as stewards and transmitters
of America's religious pluralism.
Much is made of the danger believed to flow to private religious
activity from misperceptions of endorsement, i.e., mistaken public
impressions that government is promoting or favoring otherwise nongovernmental religious speech.'
The anxiety is misplaced, since the
endorsement test in effect calls for a reviewing court to inspect for the
reasonableness of the perception. Mistaken perceptions of government
endorsement will not automatically result in decisions requiring
censorship of private religious speech, since only if a court determines
the perception was reasonable will it require the state to do anything to
prevent or counteract the appearance. If the inference of endorsement
is found to be reasonable, it will have been because of facts which

105. See Sekulow et aL., supra note 17.

106. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[njothing
in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court... prohibits public school
students from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday"). Id.
107.

478 U.S. 675 (1986) (school had power, as inculcator of "civility," to discipline

student for sexually suggestive speech during student government nominating assembly).
108. See, e.g., Thomas F. LaMacchia, Reverse Accommodation ofReligion, 81 GEO. L.J.
112, 118 (1992) (giving as examples of "over-separation" in public schools a ban on

traditional Muslim teacher attire, discipline of a teacher for reading the Bible during a
silent reading period and then leaving it out on his desk, and discipline of a physical
education teacher for explaining in class his belief that a "divine force" was behind the
complexity of the human physique).
109.

See Sekulow, et al., supra note 17 (discussing misperceptions of endorsement).
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permitted the court to conclude that government had acted so as to
foster the inference.110
With regard specifically to prayers at public school graduations, where
the religionist critique of Weisman goes wrong is that it either evades or
begs the central question posed in the graduation prayer cases: the
constitutionality of granting official permission to group prayer or
religious observances-student-led, student-initiated, or otherwise-at
official school functions. The plaintiffs in Gearon argued, and the court
agreed, that officially-sponsored student prayer at such functions was
just as corrosive of religious freedom as was the graduation prayer
enjoined in Weisman. Perhaps the fact that most securely bound Gearon
to Weisman was that the prayer in both cases was, for the moment of its
duration, the group activity to which the ceremony was devoted. The
For
audience was expected to participate, and not just by listening.'
the same reason there would have been a key constitutional difference
between a monologue at graduation by an individual student, religious
in its content or not, and a religious call-and-response oration by the
same student in which the audience was asked to join. Even if neither
speech were reviewed in advance by school officials, the latter expression
would present more delicate problems than the former to the extent that
the state sponsor expected group participation. 2 in the religious
activity as a part of the occasion's state purpose.
At a minimum, the grant of authority for public prayer as a group
activity, as part of the program at a state-sponsored gathering whose
function is an expression of a common bond or purpose, is a government
establishment of religion. The court in Gearon grasped that Weisman
necessarily extended to public school graduation cases of this type even
where the prayer was student-initiated or student-delivered. In holding
fast to Weisman's principles for the majority-vote graduation prayer case,
Gearon not only preserved the individual right at stake but reinforced

110. One interesting question is whether, under the endorsement test of Allegheny
County, a court may infer endorsement more readily where the religious practice or

expression said to be endorsed is popular or favored by a political majority. It may be that
a sliding scale of this sort for endorsements based on the popularity of the religious
expression at issue is a workable refinement of endorsement theory, but that discussion
is beyond the scope of this Article.
111. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2659 ("the State, in a school setting, in effect required

participation in a religious exercise"). Id.
112. Id. By noting the state's expectancy of "group participation," I do not mean to
suggest that in Gearon,for instance, or even in Jones, the school system intended for no
one to be able to "opt out." But, as Weisman explicitly held, the "opt" of non-participating

by non-attendance or "let[ting one's] mind wander" is no option at all. Id.
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the emerging consensus of the courts that a student head count is no
substitute for the Constitution's guarantees.
III.

CONCLUSION

Put in the bluntest terms, the tug-of-war over applying the Establishment Clause to public education continues chiefly because some people
cannot accept the norms of a pluralistic American social order that is
designed to preserve their freedom to practice their religion as they
choose-but also designed to keep them from imposing their personal
religious preferences on a larger community which may contain people
of differing belief or interest. This rather radical brand of religious
toleration is the great experiment of our republic, and may be what most
readily distinguishes us from our sister nations in Europe or elsewhere
that otherwise have similar political orders.,
The United States Supreme Court's decisions against organized,
officially sponsored prayer in public schools keep faith with this founding
principle. They do not stop anyone from praying, any more than do
Court decisions invalidating "moment of silence" laws." 4 Prayer is a
private act that the government can neither compel nor prevent. It is
not prayer, but the government's involvement in prayer, that offends the
Constitution.
Freedom of religion in this country means we have decided to treat
questions of theology as questions of personal religious belief, not as
questions of fact. To a believer in the literal truth of the existence of
God, that truth may be as real and reliable as the ground beneath one's
feet. But to someone who does not hold the same belief, the two "truths"
are different--one a matter of faith, the other of fact. The political
principle of religious freedom in a diverse community is necessarily
based on the idea that even disputes over the distinction between facts
and beliefs are issues of belief, not fact. The order of our democracy
assumes, and the assumption is essential and salutary, that each of us
shares the polity with persons who beliefs about these basic questions
differ from our own.

113. See ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 319-20 (1831) (Vintage ed.
1945) for the famous observation that
members of all the different [religious] sects ... all attributed the peaceful
dominion of religion in their country mainly to the separation of church and state
... during my stay in America I did not meet a single individual, of the clergy or
the laity, who was not of the same opinion on this point.
114. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 67 (O'Conn&r, J., concurring) ("[n]othing in [the]
Constitution ... prohibits public school students from voluntarily praying at any time
before, during, or after theschoolday"). Id.
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This ideal of tolerance is the basis of the argument that governments
are not to confuse religious and secular matters. It is the reason we do
not preach in the schools, for there are many forms of religious
belief-including the absence of such belief-and no one of us is
supremely qualified to decide whose belief we should inculcate in
everyone, or how. In the inevitable situations where conflict arises
between public education and personal religious conviction, our
Constitution commands that we learn and teach religion in the personal
sphere, not impose it on one another through the nation's institutions.
Public education's very purpose is to preserve and protect this tradition,
both to keep order in the classrooms of today and to make the schools of
tomorrow worth funding, attending, and laboring to perfect.
Above all, if we hope to live out the meaning of religious freedom as
the framers of the Constitution conceived it, we must not fall into the
trap of inferring hostility to our religious beliefs or interests from
society's or government's failure to prefer them affirmatively over the
beliefs or interests of others. A multi-religious society whose members
infer disapproval of their beliefs from government neutrality in matters
of belief, or who require affirmative preferences in the name of that
neutrality, does not deserve to be called a tolerant, an egalitarian or a
truly free society. We have all had to play in the same sandbox for two
centuries of America's great religious experiment. We might as well get
used to it.

